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A frontier challenge for development strategy is to 
move beyond prescribing optimal economic policies, 
and instead—taking a broad view of the interactions 
between economic, political and social constraints 
and dynamics—to identify entry points capable of 
breaking a low-growth logjam, and initiating a virtuous 
spiral of cumulative change. The paper lays out four 
distinctive sequences via which the different dimensions 
might interact and evolve over time, and provides 
country-specific illustrations of each. Each sequence is 
defined by the principal focus of its initial step: 1) State 
capacity building provides a platform for accelerated 
growth via improved public sector performance and 
enhanced credibility for investors; strengthened political 
institutions and civil society come onto the agenda only 
over the longer term; 2) Transformational governance has 
as its entry point the reshaping of a country’s political 
institutions. Accelerated growth could follow, insofar as 
institutional changes enhance accountability, and reduce 
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Presidency—is part of a larger effort in the department to better address governance challenges in the design and 
implementation of development strategies. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.
worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at blevy@worldbank.org.  
the potential for arbitrary discretionary action —and 
thereby shift expectations in a positive direction; 3) For 
‘just enough governance’, the initial focus is on growth 
itself, with the aim of addressing specific capacity and 
institutional constraints as and when they become 
binding—not seeking to anticipate and address in 
advance all possible institutional constraints; 4) Bottom-
up development engages civil society as an entry point for 
seeking stronger state capacity, lower corruption, better 
public services, improvements in political institutions 
more broadly—and a subsequent unlocking of 
constraints on growth. 
   The sequences should not be viewed as a technocratic 
toolkit from which a putative reformer is free to choose. 
Recognizing that choice is constrained by history, the 
paper concludes by suggesting an approach for exploring 
what might the scope for identifying practical ways 
forward in specific country settings. - 1 - 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES: INTEGRATING GOVERNANCE AND GROWTH 
Brian Levy and Francis Fukuyama1
I: OVERVIEW 
 
There is widespread agreement among social scientists that 
development is a multidimensional phenomenon, with economic, political, 
and social aspects, and that the different dimensions of development 
are interconnected with one another in complex ways.  The fact that 
these different dimensions exert causal influences on one another would 
suggest that policymakers dealing with issues of national development 
need to integrate economic, political, and social approaches, and to 
think strategically about how to achieve their goals.   
Strategic thinking implies prioritization and sequencing, seeking 
to do first that which is necessary or helpful to achieve later goals. 
A strategy begins by defining a clear objective (e.g., are we aiming in 
the first instance at economic growth, democratization, establishment 
of a rule of law, a more vigorous civil society?), and then assesses 
constraints that prevent the achievement of this objective.  Strategic 
thinking looks at alternative pathways that get around those 
constraints; if this is not possible, it requires the redirection of 
energies to other goals that are more realistically achievable.   
Yet development policymakers and practitioners seldom think in 
this manner.  That is, they do not integrate political, economic, and 
social strategies; they do not set clear priorities or sequence reforms 
over time; and they do not pay sufficient attention to constraints.  
Development strategies in official documents often read like wish lists 
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School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University - 2 - 
of all of the good things that the sponsors would like to see happen, 
with little appreciation for what needs to be done first in order to 
facilitate the achievement of other objectives down the road.   
There are several reasons for this lack of strategic thinking 
about development.  Development specialists tend to be 
compartmentalized by academic discipline.  While economists, for 
example, have recently come to take politics and institutions more 
seriously, their first inclination is usually not to think about the 
political preconditions for achieving economic goals.  Conversely, 
people in the democracy promotion field often do not pay attention to 
economic issues, or else relegate growth to a second-order priority.  
In the donor community, there is a great deal of political sensitivity 
on the question of sequencing or prioritization.  If one admits that 
there is little chance for a democratic breakthrough or for cleaning up 
a particular corrupt bureaucracy, one appears to be endorsing a bad 
status quo.  
The one strategic issue that has generated a substantial amount 
of debate concerns the sequencing of economic and political reforms.  
Proponents of the so-called “authoritarian transition” like Huntington 
(1968) and Zakaria (2003) have argued in favor of putting economic 
development and establishment of a liberal rule of law ahead of 
democratization, given that a stronger causal connection appears to 
exist from economic growth to democracy than the other way around.  
Others like Plattner (1999) and Carothers (2007) have argued that such 
sequencing is not a practical option in most cases, and that advocates 
of reform in developing and transitional countries usually want both 
rule of law and democracy simultaneously.   
This debate is a worthwhile one, but too limited in certain 
respects.  There are more dimensions of development than economic - 3 - 
growth and democracy, and therefore more entry points to consider when 
designing a national development strategy.  Strategic thinking about 
development requires consideration of the full range of these entry 
points, and how progress along one dimension affects progress in the 
others.   
This paper suggests a more comprehensive framework for thinking 
about development strategies and for integrating political, economic, 
and social policies. The next section introduces each of five 
dimensions, and summarizes briefly what is known about their causal 
links with one another. Section III lays out four distinctive sequences 
via which the different dimensions might interact and evolve over time. 
The final section examines how the ‘sequences framework’ can aid 
development decision-making.  
II: THE DIMENSIONS OF DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
There are five broad dimensions of development, one economic, one 
social, and three political:  
•  economic growth 
•  development of civil society 
•  state-building 
•  liberal democratic political institutions, including both rule of 
law and electoral democracy 
We will discuss each of these dimensions as entry points for 
development, and as objectives of development in themselves.  
Obviously, each of these dimensions contains within itself a vast 
number of goals and approaches.  What we seek to do here is not to 
choose one over another, but to begin to understand how they are 
related to one another. - 4 - 
Economic growth.  We define economic growth in a narrow, 
traditional sense, as increasing per capita GDP.  Much of the field of 
development economics has centered around strategies for promoting 
growth, and there have been numerous approaches, fads and orthodoxies 
in this area over the years. Some growth strategies result in a more 
egalitarian income distribution than others – a variation that, as will 
become evident, can be relevant for the longer-term sustainability of a 
country’s development path. Many East Asian fast developers like Japan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan pursued industrial policies involving targeted 
credits and managed sectoral transitions.  By contrast, the 1980s and 
90s saw the rise of a very different approach, the so-called 
“Washington Consensus” that sought to reduce state intervention in 
favor of market pricing.  We do not intend to rehash familiar arguments 
over the relative merits of these and other economic strategies, except 
to note that, in addition to differing in their implications for income 
distribution, they have rather different political and institutional 
requirements.  As Haggard (1990) suggests, industrial policies can be 
made to work, but require a substantially greater degree of 
technocratic capacity to manage properly than ones that rely on market 
pricing.  Equally important, they are liable to capture by various 
political actors seeking rents, and have to be carefully insulated from 
them.   
Development of Civil Society.  There is a large body of social 
thought detailing the social changes that take place as a society 
shifts from one that is primarily agricultural to one that is 
industrial.  In the former, social relationships are often ascriptive 
rather than voluntary, based on kinship, ethnicity, social class, and 
gender.  Social hierarchies are often inherited, with little 
opportunities for individuals to change the status into which they were - 5 - 
born.  In addition, the division of labor is limited by the small size 
of the market economy and non-agricultural sector.  A modern civil 
society emerges when social groups between the family and the state are 
able to freely organize on the basis of shared passions and interests.  
Developed societies remain hierarchical, but hierarchies ideally are 
more fluid and accessible; social mobility and representation 
increases.    
 
State-building.  State-building is itself a multi-dimensional 
phenomenon that is the precursor of and necessary condition for either 
liberal rule of law or democracy.  We will make use here of Max Weber’s 
famous definition of the state:  a legitimate monopoly of force over a 
defined terrority.  State-building begins with a concentration of 
coercive power in the hands of the state, through the disarming or 
destruction of private militias and the creation of a national army and 
police.  It also involves defining the state’s territorial extent (by 
either incorporating or sloughing off particular geographical regions), 
and extending the reach of the state’s enforcement power over that 
territory.  Finally, state-building involves creating administrative 
capacity in the form of public bureaucracies.  Core state functions 
(beyond internal and external security) include the ability to extract 
taxes, the ability to budget and spend money, and the ability to 
enforce the state’s rules.  In more established states, state-building 
can also refer to the expansion of state functions, improvement of 
state efficiency in provision of services, and control of official 
corruption.   
Liberal Democratic Political Institutions.  While state-building 
involves the concentration of power in the state’s hands, establishment 
of modern political institutions limits that power by reducing the - 6 - 
state’s discretionary use of force.  The “liberal” part of liberal 
democracy is rule of law.  Rule of law is the basis for property rights 
and the adjudication of commerial claims, and thus is key to sustained 
economic development.  Rule of law is also the basis for the protection 
of a private sphere and individual human rights.  Legal rights do not 
have to be universal; in some societies, they are enjoyed only by 
elites who benefit from the full privileges of citizenship.  
Universalization of the rule of law permits larger markets, greater 
competition, and in the long run, more economic growth. 
A second aspect of political institutions is democracy, that is, 
popular sovereignty through regular multiparty elections.  Democracy 
can involve a number of different mechanisms for holding governments 
accountable to the people.  Besides elections, there are other 
mechanisms of accountability as well such as separated powers which 
monitor each other’s behavior, and a free press and civil society 
outside of the formal political system that can monitor and check the 
government’s performance.  As in the case of rule of law, democracy 
puts limits on the state’s discretion and forces it to reflect the will 
of at least some important proportion of the people.  
All five of these dimensions are goals of development in 
themselves, and they can exist, for the most part, independently of one 
another.  That is, one can have growth without social development, and 
social development without increases in either state capacity or 
democracy.  It is possible to have an illiberal democracy, and a 
liberal autocracy, and both democracies and autocracies can experience 
either low or high growth.  While a rudimentary state is a necessary 
precondition for economic growth, rule of law, and democracy, it is 
also possible to have some or all of the latter three conditions in a 
weak state.   - 7 - 
There is a sixth, intangible factor that is critical to 
development, which is the credibility and legitimacy of the state.  
Credibility has to do with expectations that the government will do 
what it promises, whether that is upholding individual human rights or 
protecting the interests of property owners.  Legitimacy has to do with 
the degree to which the society’s citizens believe that the system as a 
whole is just, and deserving of their support (even if they disagree 
with certain of the government’s policies).  Credibility and legitimacy 
are related to the five main channels of development described above – 
whether, for example, the benefits of growth are perceived to be shared 
--  but are not simply coterminous with any of them.  They arise as 
byproducts of the other channels, but are not in themselves entry 
points for development.  
We know that there are certain presumed causal relationships 
between certain of these dimensions that can form the basis for 
development strategies.  The presumption of causality is based on a 
combination of theoretical reasoning and empirical correlations between 
the different phenomena. Though the precise causal pathways are often 
not precisely understood (for example, between development and 
democracy) some plausible relationships include: 
Between state building and growth.  Basic state formation is a 
precondition for sustained growth.  Paul Collier (2007) has 
demonstrated the converse of this proposition, namely, that civil war 
and interstate conflict have very negative consequences for economic 
growth.  Having a Weberian state at peace is a precondition not just 
for sustained growth, but for virtually all of the other development 
objectives (fair distribution, rule of law, democracy). 
Beyond establishment of a state that can provide for basic order, 
greater administrative capacity is also strongly correlated with - 8 - 
economic growth.  This is particularly true at low absolute levels of 
per capita GDP (i.e., less that $1000); while it remains important at 
higher levels of income, the impact may not be proportionate.  There is 
also a large literature linking good goverance to economic growth.  
There is a debate over the direction of causality here, with Sachs 
maintaining that governance is endogenous to growth; Easterly (2006) 
has argued that the causality goes the other way.  It would seem likely 
that causality here is bidirectional, and that economic growth 
facilitates greater state administrative capacity.   
Between liberal rule of law and growth.  There is a large 
literature demonstrating the correlation between property rights (and a 
supporting rule of law) and growth (see Acemoglu and Robinson 2005).  
While most economists take this for granted, there is an interesting 
new literature showing that growth can also occur under situations 
where property rights and rule of law are not universal, that is, where 
elites grant rents to themselves (see Haber, Razo, and Maurer 2003; 
Khan and Jomo 2000).   
Between economic growth and stable democracy.  Beginning with 
Lipset (1958) there has been a large literature linking development and 
democracy (Diamond 1992).  The relationship between growth and 
democracy may not be linear; Barro (1997) shows that it is stronger at 
lower and weaker at middle levels of income.  Przeworski and Alvarez 
(1997) show that while democratic transitions can occur at any level of 
development, they are much less likely to be reversed past a level of 
about $6000 per capita. The evidence linking democracy to economic 
growth is much less clear; what the data show is a much wider variance 
in the economic performance of autocracies than democracies.  
Between liberal rule of law and democracy.  While we do not know 
of empirical studies explicitly correlating these factors, we presume - 9 - 
it must be true because there are many examples of liberal democracy, 
and relatively few cases of liberal autocracy (though perhaps more in 
the past).  Whether a causal connection exists as Plattner suggests is 
not clear, but may well be so.   
Between growth and the development of civil society.  A lot of 
classic social theory predicates the emergence of modern civil society 
on economic development (see for example Gellner 1992).  Adam Smith in 
the Wealth of Nations notes that the extent of the market determines 
the division of labor; as growth occurs and firms take advantage of 
economies of scale, social specialization increases and new social 
groups (e.g., an industrial working class) emerge.  The fluidity and 
open access demanded by modern market economies undermines certain 
traditional forms of authority and forces the replacement of ascriptive 
with voluntary social groups.     
Between development of civil society and liberal democracy.  From 
Tocqueville onwards there has been a large body of democratic theory 
arguing that modern liberal democracy cannot exist without a vigorous 
civil society.  The latter allows weak individuals to pool their 
interests and enter the political system; even when social groups do 
not seek political objectives, voluntary associations have spillover 
effects in creating social capital.  A highly developed civil society 
also poses dangers for democracy as well:  groups based on ethnic or 
racial chauvinism spread intolerance; interest groups can invest effort 
in zero-sum rent seeking; excessive politicization of economic and 
social conflicts can paralyze societies and undermine the legitimacy of 
democratic institutions.  The correlation that exists between economic 
growth and stable liberal democracy (Lipset 1958; Przeworski 1993) is 
presumably mediated by this channel:  growth entails the emergence of - 10 - 
new social actors who then demand representation in a more open 
political system.   
Between the development of civil society and state-building.  
There are two opposing propositions as to the ‘sign’ of the coefficient 
that links these two dimensions. Huntington (1968) argued that there 
was often a negative relationship between the mobilization of new 
social actors and political order when existing political institutions 
could not accommodate their demands for participation.  On the other 
hand, contemporary thinking about governance reform asserts that civil 
society, in the form of free media and organized citizens’ groups, are 
necessary to promote transparency with regard to the quality of 
government and accountability when abuses are uncovered. Plausibly, 
which of these opposing propositions is dominant depends on a country’s 
institutional starting point – with the former proposition more 
relevant in settings where political institutions and state capacities 
are especially weak (Bates 2008). - 11 - 
III: ENTRY POINTS AND SEQUENCES 
Consider as a starting point a low-income country enjoying little 
or no economic growth. As the political-economic framework outlined in 
the previous section suggests, the challenge for reformers is not to 
prescribe optimal economic policies, but rather -- taking a broader 
view of the interactions between economic and political constraints and 
dynamics -- to identify entry points capable of breaking the low-growth 
logjam, and initiating a virtuous spiral of cumulative change. The 
relevant constraints, plausible entry points, and subsequent dynamics 
all are country-specific. There is no ‘one size fits all’ – but there 
appear to be a few overarching patterns. To help guide the search for 
country-specific actions, this section will lay out four distinctive 
development sequences –  each initiated by distinctive entry points, 
and with distinctive subsequent paths.  
 
Sequence I: State Capacity Building 
When a low-income country is not growing, some of the key reasons 
are plainly visible to lay citizens, as well as experts. Government 
doesn’t work. Political leaders are inept or corrupt (or both). The 
risks to private investors and entrepreneurs -- of failed 
infrastructure, of a dysfunctional, burdensome bureaucracy, of 
political pressures to ‘share’ profits, of violence and instability – 
generally overwhelm any entrepreneurial instinct to seek out 
opportunities for productive investment.  
In environments such as these, a natural response of a country’s 
citizens (and its development partners) is to look for ‘political will’ 
– for leadership ready to respond to the public interest rather than 
private ends, to improve policy-making, to fix the broken bureaucracy, 
to make wise public investments, and to put in place an environment - 12 - 
capable of attracting private investment. More broadly, the entry point 
implicit in this first of four development sequences is to build the 
capacities needed to transform state dysfunction into state 
effectiveness. 
Key transmission channels. Figure 1 depicts how state capacity 
building potentially could set in motion a virtuous development spiral.  
The first step is an investment in state capacity building. The second 
step applies this newly built capacity to promoting economic growth. 
This impact potentially can occur via three complementary channels: 
•  Channel 2a highlights the direct links between improvements in 
state performance and economic performance. Better policies, more 
efficient infrastructure, a transactionally more efficient 
bureaucracy, transparent and participatory approaches to service 
provision – all of these can contribute to a better investment 
climate, and thus potentially to growth. Improving infrastructure 
and the bureaucracy takes time, with little opportunity for 
‘quick wins -- policy, though, can be turned around quite 
rapidly. 
•  Channel 2b highlights the expectations-driven impact of the 
emergence of leadership perceived to have the ‘political will’ to 
build state capacity. Even before public sector performance 
actually improves, credibility can rise among private investors 
as to the productive potential of the economy – with the 
credibility gain itself sometimes sufficient to achieve renewed 
economic activity, and an acceleration of growth. (One common way - 13 - 
to secure such credibility has been to move rapidly to adopt far-
reaching ‘stroke of the pen’ economic reforms.2
•  As channel 2c suggests, political leaders can make the capacity 
and credibility channels mutually reinforcing by asserting a 
broader commitment to ‘fairness’ – to inclusive growth with 
broadly shared benefits. Insofar as citizens believe this 
commitment, state legitimacy and stability will both be enhanced 
– contributing more broadly to improvements in the investment 
climate, and hence to growth. 
) 
Figure 1: State Capacity Building as an Entry Point for Development 
   
Note that none of the channels described above involve political 
institutions. Insofar as a sequence led by state capacity building can 
                         
2 Thus, paradoxically, for reasons that will be elaborated later, 
insofar as ‘structural adjustment’ can be said to have had an implicit 
institutional model, it fits best with the state capacity building 
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lead to transformation of political institutions, the route is a long-
term and indirect one – with social change (via, say, participatory 
approaches to service provision, wealth creation, and rise of a middle 
class) generating new pressures for the rule of law to manage inter-
elite conflicts (both between firms, and between businesses and the 
state), and for political reform more broadly.  Channel 3, the dotted 
line in Figure 1 illustrates this longer-term dynamic. 
  Experiences and challenges. Readers familiar with the development 
literature will recognize the sequence described above as that of the 
‘developmental state’. The past fifty years offers no shortage of 
countries  -- and political leaders – that have put themselves forward 
as aspirant ‘developmental states’. It was the dominant model 
underlying East Asian development. It was an aspiration of many Latin 
American countries (including Brazil and Mexico) prior to the 1980s. 
The former centrally planned economies offered a (failed) radical 
variant for much of the twentieth century. Still today – though 
communism has collapsed, and the international economic and political 
environment is very different than that which prevailed during the rise 
of the East Asian developmental states --there is no shortage of as 
aspirant developmental states among low-income countries.  Examples 
range from Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda in Africa, to Azerbaijan in 
Central Asia, and Vietnam in South East Asia. In each of these cases, 
governments combine efforts to win legitimacy by highlighting the 
competence of their rule, on the one hand, with a continuing wariness 
of greater political participation and accountability, on the other. 
Each has achieved quite strong economic performance (relative to their 
peers, and/or their preceding historical experience).  
A few development states have been spectacularly successful, with 
Korea and Taiwan two classic examples. In both countries, development - 15 - 
was led by interventionist, competent states that used pro-active 
industrial policies to fuel growth. In both, the initial decades of 
accelerated development were under authoritarian rule – but in both 
‘fairness’ provided a basis of legitimacy. Land reforms assured rural 
equity; growth was oriented towards labor-intensive exports and so 
employment creating; high public investment in education provided 
opportunity for all. And in both, inclusive growth set in motion 
profound social transformation – facilitating the emergence of a middle 
class, and an eventual transition to democracy.  
Sustained success remains, however, more the exception than the 
rule. Two sets of cautions seem especially relevant for a development 
strategy based on building state capacity. 
A first caution is that in the early years of a new political 
leadership, it can be difficult to tell whether a seeming commitment to 
‘developmentalism’ and associated state capacity building is real, or 
simply a useful cover for the perpetuation of longstanding patterns of 
corrupt, patrimonial rule. From Moi in Kenya, to Suharto in Indonesia 
and Marcos in the Philippines, recent history is replete with leaders 
who have touted themselves as ‘developmental’, concentrated authority 
on the basis of its necessity for their achieving ‘developmental’ 
goals, and been showered with largesse from a supportive donor 
community – only to have their reigns end in recrimination, corruption 
and disgrace. Such regimes often use the rhetoric of‘state capacity 
building’ as a key part of their program: it has the virtue of being 
long on ambition and fine-sounding objectives, but sufficiently ‘soft’ 
and supposedly ‘long-term’ in its impact that busy work can proceed for 
long periods of time before it becomes evident that nothing much is 
being achieved.  - 16 - 
The second set of cautions concerns the move towards more 
pluralistic political institutions (Step 3 in Figure 1). As Figure 1 
implies, developmental states typically focus first on  economic and 
bureaucratic reforms, while neglecting reform of political 
institutions. Korea and Taiwan offer successful examples of a seemingly 
successful subsequent institutional ‘catch-up’, but other trajectories 
also are feasible.   Singapore, for example, generally has been 
included with Korea and Taiwan as an example of East Asian success – 
but for all of its contemporary economic prowess, unlike the latter two 
countries, Singapore shows no sign of making a transition to democracy. 
Alternatively, as Indonesia’s difficult political evolution over the 
past decade illustrates, the transition to democracy can be an 
unusually fraught affair, insofar as it has to proceed against the 
backdrop of an earlier lack of investment in political institutions and 
associated underdevelopment of the social expectations that support 
such institutions. How this process will play out for China – whether 
the latter will be stably authoritarian, as in Singapore, make a 
relatively smooth transition to democracy, as in Korea and Taiwan, or 
experience significant social dislocation, as in Indonesia – is one of 
the key global imponderables for the coming decades. 
 
Sequence II: Transformational Governance 
The second development sequence has as its entry point an effort 
to transform the country’s political institutions by strengthening the 
rule of law and establishing democratic mechanisms for selecting a 
country’s leaders.  As noted earlier, the correlation between the 
quality of state institutions and per capita income is clear:  When per 
capita income is high, the rule of law, democratic institutions and the 
public bureaucracy all work well.  Further, in high income countries - 17 - 
these institutions are mutually reinforcing, with the checks and 
balances provided by democracy and the rule of law providing a 
corrective mechanism that helps keep the polity from veering too far 
astray, even in the face of dysfunctional political leadership.  Thus 
both democracy and the rule of law serve as  checks on a leadership 
that might, for example, seek to pervert the functioning of the 
bureaucracy for narrow political ends.  
Against that backdrop, consider a country that has been saddled 
endemically with factionalized elites, and self-seeking and 
unaccountable political leadership. Because rule-boundedness is weak, a 
poorly-functioning bureaucracy is likely to be part of this 
dysfunctional governance syndrome. Given these endemic weaknesses,  the 
option of the country constructing a developmental state is not likely 
to be credible. A natural response of the country’s citizens (and its 
developmental partners) is to focus on political institutions 
themselves.  
Figure 2 illustrates three distinct channels through which a 
transformation of political institutions hypothetically could catalyze 
a virtuous development spiral. The first channel [steps 2ai & 2aii in 
Figure 2] comprises the direct impact of a transformation of political 
institutions on credibility and legitimacy. This transformation could 
comprise one or both of a move to political democracy or a 
strengthening of the rule of law: 
•  A move to democracy holds the prospect that elections can be a 
quick route to a radically transformed political leadership – 
with legitimacy, with a mandate to pursue developmentally-
oriented policies, and accountable to citizens. (As discussed 
below, other outcomes are, of course, also plausible.) - 18 - 
•  A stronger rule of law holds the prospect of introducing into the 
governance equation both clearer rules of the game, and impartial 
mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing compliance with the 
rules.  Note, though, that under the best of circumstances, the 
task of building the capacity of a country’s justice system is a 
long-term one.  And note also that the incentives of incumbent 
elites to support the strengthening of these discretion-
restraining institutions are likely to be mixed. 
For both, the hope is that institutional changes will enhance the 
accountability of a country’s leadership, and reduce the potential for 
arbitrary, discretionary action – thereby shifting expectations and 
kick-starting growth. 
The second channel linking political institutions and growth is 
via state capacity (steps 2bi & 3).3
                         
3 The numbering of the channels signals the possibility that steps 
2ai,  2bi and 2ci can all be directly initiated by political 
transformation – but experience suggests that actual gains in 
bureaucratic capacity and perceptions of fairness take time. 
  Political transformation has the 
potential to radically improve both the incentives and the means for 
state capacity building. The improved incentives could follow from a 
shift from self-seeking to more accountable and hence public-good 
oriented leadership, leadership that would be more likely to invest in 
state capacity as a way of improving  development performance.  And 
improved means for state capacity building could come about because 
greater accountability and rule-boundedness are not only key intended 
outcomes of political transformation, they also are important 
requisites for a well-functioning public bureaucracy. As in the case of 
the developmental state, better public sector capacity can directly 
enhance growth. - 19 - 
 
Figure 2: Institutional Transformation as an Entry Point for Development 
 
 
The third channel linking political transformation and growth 
works via the development of civil society (steps 2ci and 4). As will 
be discussed further in the context of the fourth sequence, the 
transformation of political institutions and the development of civil 
society are strongly complementary. Insofar as many citizens had 
historically distrusted state authority even to the point of, at the 
limit, direct resistance, a transformation of citizen-state relations 
and the emergence of a rich array of civil society institutions  could 
enhance the legitimacy of state institutions, thereby bolstering 
investor confidence – and hence growth. 
Note that both channels 2bi and 2ci (and also strengthened rule 
of law) affect growth only over the longer-term, and so are shown as 
dotted lines in the figure.  Reformers looking to ‘transformational 
governance’ as a quick-fix to kickstart growth must thus rely on early 
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elections indeed have a credibility-enhancing impact and kick-start 
growth — the temptation could be strong to enjoy the fruits of these 
early success, with weakened momentum to address the longer-run 
institutional challenges.  Later sections of the paper will consider 
this last variant of transformational governance in more depth.  
  Experiences and challenges. To illustrate the relationship 
between political transformation  and economic performance consider 
three divergent sets of experiences. The first comprises post-communist 
countries  that have recently acceded to the European Union (or hope to 
do so in the relatively near future). As has been well documented, in 
at least three ways the prospect of joining the EU proved to be a 
powerful engine of  reform. First, the perceived benefit of EU 
membership provided a powerful incentive for change. Second, the EU 
acquis and related political expectations provided a clear, explicit 
institutional model for accession countries to follow. Third, the EU 
connection provided a strong mechanism for signaling credibly both the 
direction and commitment of countries to continuing reform. The 2004 
accession of 10 countries to the EU – and the anchor it provided for 
continuing, steady, economic performance – ranks as a major 
institutional success story globally over the past half century.  
  A second group of countries that have used improved political 
institutions to transform governance are in Latin America.  Democracy 
was of course more deeply rooted in Latin American than in other parts 
of the developing world, but suffered massive setbacks with the onset 
of military regimes in the mid-1960s.  Virtually the whole hemisphere 
returned to democracy by the early 1990s, and the quality of democracy 
has, by various measures, been steadily improving.  This is measurable 
by increasing rates of voting over the past three decades across the 
continent, but also through qualitative transformations by which power - 21 - 
has been pushed down to lower levels of the political hierarchy, giving 
citizens greater voice and participation.  Brazil, Colombia, Peru, 
Venezueala, and Bolivia are among the countries that have undergone 
decentralization programs in recent years.   
  The result of greater citizen participation at lower levels of 
government has in many cases increased the quality of governance. 
Bolivia’s 1994 Law of Popular Participation, for example, has led to 
the reallocation of public resources in a pro-poor direction.  In 
Colombia, directly elected mayors with increased municipal autonomy 
have engaged in a variety of innovative programs to control gangs and 
drugs.  And in Brazil, traditional patronage politics has been curbed 
through innovative programs like Porto Alegre’s participatory 
budgeting; according to one observer, Brazilian “voters have developed 
a habit of using the ballot box to punish mayors or governors who 
devoted a disproportionate share of their revenues to public employment 
rather than services or investment.” (Reid, 2007, p.292)   
The third set of experiences comprises the democratizing reforms 
undertaken by 40 sub-Saharan African countries in the early 1990s. 
(Bratton and van de Walle, 1997) Africa’s transition to democracy 
happened as comprehensively and as rapidly as that of Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union. The experience of South Africa illustrates 
that even without the anchor of the European Union democratization can 
nonetheless provide a springboard for broader improvements in 
development performance, via each of the channels identified in Figure 
2: 
•  The transformation of expectations (steps 2ai-> 2aii) turned out 
to have been a slower process than many had hoped. To be sure, 
legitimacy was hugely enhanced via the shift from apartheid to 
democratic majority rule – in part because South Africa’s - 22 - 
political transformation translated rapidly into a radical shift 
of the pattern of public spending in favor of the poor majority. 
But only after over a half-dozen post-apartheid years of among 
the best managed macro-economic policies in the developing world 
did markets overcome their fears of instability and re-rate South 
Africa’s creditworthiness upwards. Growth accelerated slowly in 
the latter 1990s tgo just over 5% by 2007.  
•  The impact of political transformation on state capacity (steps 
2ai => 2bi =>3) has been less clear.  South Africa’s move to 
democracy created the opportunity for a new vision to motivate 
its public sector (which in the years prior to the transition to 
majority rule had gone from being the relentless implementers of 
the architecture of apartheid to become a cynical, demoralized 
and self-seeking bureaucracy) – but it also required the 
bureaucracy to transform itself from a bastion of white privilege 
into a public sector whose complexion resembled the country as a 
whole. 
Yet Thomas Carothers (2002) analysis suggests that the South African 
experience of democratization supporting development is something of an 
African outlier. He argues that ‘transition’ to democracy need not be a 
seamless path to well-functioning, competitive political and market 
institutions but could settle into either of  two less benign 
syndromes:  
 “‘Dominant-power politics’, where countries ‘have limited but 
still real political space, some political contestation by 
opposition groups, and most of the basic institutional forms of 
democracy. Yet one political grouping dominates the system in such 
a way that there appears to be little prospect of alternation of 
power….. The state’s main assets -- as a source of money, jobs, 
public information (via state media) – are gradually put in direct 
service of the ruling party. …the judiciary is typically 
cowed….citizens tend to be disaffected from politics and cut off 
from significant political participation beyond voting.” 
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Carothers notes that Africa’s wave of democratization in the early 
1990s ended up producing many dominant-power systems – some cases (e.g. 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Mauritania and 
Tanzania) where a hitherto one-party state liberalized but with only 
limited subsequent political opening, and others (e.g. Zambia) where 
new regimes ended up in dominant-party structures. Note that, for all 
of its limitations insofar as the renewal (via partial democratization) 
of a dominant power system enhances state capacity, growth could 
nonetheless accelerate via the mechanisms summarized in Figure 1.  
“In ‘feckless pluralism’, (the second syndrome)  countries enjoy 
alternation of power between genuinely different groupings, but 
“democracy remains shallow and troubled. Political participation… 
extends little beyond voting. Political elites from all the major 
parties are perceived as corrupt, self-interested and ineffective. 
The alternation of power seems only to trade the country’s problems 
back and forth from one hapless side to the other.” 
 
Carothers notes that  ‘in sub-Saharan Africa, alternation of power 
remains rare generally’. He reports feckless pluralism to be  an 
especially common pattern in Latin America, and widespread also in the 
postcommunist world.  The prospects of feckless pluralism generating 
growth via state capacity building appear bleaker than for the dominant 
power politics syndrome. As will become evident, though, it could 
nonetheless be growth-enhancing via the ‘just enough governance’ 
sequence – to which we now turn. 
Sequence III: ‘Just Enough’ Governance; Growth as Entry Point 
Both of the dynamic sequences considered to this point have had 
as their first step one or another kind of institutional reform.  
Though this focus on institutions is very different from the earlier 
pre-occupation of development practitioners with economic policy, both 
the institutional and economic approaches share a common presumption – 
namely that far-reaching reform was necessary to unlock development in - 24 - 
hitherto poorly-performing countries. Thus,  both institutional and 
economic reformers generally were advocates of what were perceived as 
‘best practice’, optimal policies.   
In sharp contrast, recent empirical work on ‘growth 
accelerations’ has demonstrated that far-reaching reforms – either 
institutional or economic – need not be necessary to kick-start growth. 
Careful empirical analysis by Hausmann,  Pritchett and Rodrik (2004) of 
data worldwide  identified over 80 growth accelerations over the 1950-
1990 period that lasted for eight or more years .  They found that  
“The onset of economic growth does not require deep and extensive 
institutional reform …Moderate changes in country-specific 
circumstances (policies and institutional arrangements, often 
interacting with the external environment), can produce 
discontinuous changes in economic performance….” (Rodrik, 
Analytic Growth intro, pp. 8-9, 17)….. Once growth is set into 
motion, it becomes easier to maintain a virtuous cycle with high 
growth and institutional transformation feeding on each other.” 
(Rodrik, Getting Institutions Right, 2004, p.10) 
 
Consistent with this pattern, Figure 3 thus delineates a third 
development sequence – one where the first step is the initiation of 
growth itself. 
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Figure 3: Sustaining growth through incremental institutional reforms 
 
Steps 2i-2iii in Figure 3 illustrate how a ‘just enough 
governance’ development strategy ‘virtuous cycle’ might evolve 
incrementally. These steps are depicted by dotted lines, here intended 
to signify that  in a strategy of ‘just enough governance’ sustaining 
growth remains the primary objective. As growth proceeds, though, one 
or another institutional constraint might threaten to short-circuit 
expansion – perhaps weaknesses in the delivery of infrastructure or key 
public services, perhaps a rise in corruption as public officials seek 
their share of the growing economic pie, perhaps rising social 
alienation with a growing sense on the part of citizens that government 
doesn’t care about their everyday problems, perhaps the need for more 
sophisticated laws and institutions to  underpin an increasingly 
sophisticated economy. With a ‘just enough governance’ strategy, the 
goal is not to anticipate and address in advance all possible 
institutional constraints. Rather, the  focus is on addressing specific 
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Sustaining growth thus becomes something of a ‘high-wire’ act – 
continual crisis management, endlessly putting out fires in an 
environment which to the casual observer seems quite dysfunctional, but 
nonetheless defies the odds by sustaining continuing dynamism.  
Note that the ‘just enough governance’ sequence should not be 
construed as a relatively painless (if nerve-wracking) development 
strategy. For one thing, there are multiple countries where the 
economic environment is too dysfunctional,  and institutions are too 
weak,  for incremental reforms to be enough to kickstart growth. For 
another, not all binding constraints can necessarily be eased through 
incremental measures. Moreover, as growth proceeds, society changes 
profoundly – with new pressures, and new opportunities building up. At 
some point channel 3 (identical in Figures 1 and 3) is likely to become 
dominant – laying the stage for a non-incremental transformation of 
political institutions.  
  Experiences and challenges.  The ‘Bangladesh paradox’ offers a 
vivid example of the relevance of a ‘just enough governance’ 
development strategy. Over the past decade, Bangladesh has made major 
gains in development performance. In the three decades since the 
country’s independence in the early 1970s, per capita income has more 
than doubled; the poverty rate has fallen from 70 to 40 percent; child 
immunization rates have risen from negligible levels to close to 80 
peercent; life expectancy at birth has gone from 45 to 63 years. (World 
Bank, 2006) Yet over the same period, the country also rated 
consistently as among the most corrupt in the world: Other governance 
indicators also rated poorly.  Key to Bangladesh’s paradoxical 
achievement were a  series of ‘just enough’ development reforms:  good 
macro-economic management, targeted trade policy reforms which provided 
just enough openness to enable a take-off of the garment export sector - 27 - 
(and similarly-focused policies which facilitated take-offs in other 
specific sectors)4
A similar combination of seemingly chaotic governance and 
improving economic performance is evident in other countries. Consider 
Thailand, which since the 1980s has been one of the exemplars of the 
East Asia Miracle – but which never (its strong Ministry of Finance 
aside) exhibited the same levels of state capacity as, say, Korea and 
Taiwan, and which over the past decade has traversed a winding path 
from military rule to far-reaching constitutional reform, rising 
corruption and populism, a reversion to military rule, followed by 
another round of constitutional debate. The 1997 East Asian financial 
crisis temporary halted Thailand’s almost two-decade-long growth surge, 
but (despite political and economic turbulence) by 2002 it had picked 
up again to an annual rate above 5% where it has remained.  
 – plus strong civic engagement via an unusually 
strong role for the country’s well-developed non-governmental 
institutions in the provision of public services. This strong overall 
performance has occurred against the backdrop of continuing crisis – 
which included, in the twelve months prior to completion (in early 
2008) of an initial draft of this paper, a chaotic lead-in to a 
presidential election, subsequently aborted by a de facto military 
coup; the arrest on corruption charges of the country’s two leading 
politicians; and repeated ambiguity as to when and how the military 
authorities will restore democracy, resulting in a new round of street 
protests. Throughout, growth has continued. 
                         
4 Two examples which resulted in major gains in rural incomes  
comprise the introduction of a winter rice crop, and expansion in 
aquaculture. Remittances comprised another key source of economic 
growth.  - 28 - 
In the short-term, too, Kenya seemed to illustrate the potency of 
‘just enough governance’.  In 2001, the country witnessed the electoral 
defeat of a  corrupt long-term incumbent,  Daniel Arap Moi, and the 
promise of far-reaching constitutional reform. Instead, constitutional 
reform stalled – and, within three years of the exit of Moi, the 
country was subjected to a new round of high-profile allegations of 
corruption against the successor government. Nonetheless, the ouster of 
Moi proved sufficient to trigger improved economic performance, with 
growth -- which had stubbornly remained below 3% prior to 2003 -- 
accelerating to 6% by 2006. Yet the turnaround seemingly was short-
lived, with renewed political turbulence overtaking the country in the 
aftermath of bitter disputes over who won a 2008 presidential election. 
The Bangladesh, Kenya and Thailand examples point to a puzzle vis-à-
vis a ‘just enough governance’ development strategy: what is the long-
run trend – and what is the short-run ‘noise’? Is the trend sustainable 
development -- with governance weakness the ‘noise’ in the system? Or 
is the seemingly strong growth simply a short-term bubble – with 
governance turbulence signaling the hazards ahead?  Certainly, HPRs 
empirical analysis confirms that many ‘growth accelerations’  are 
followed by subsequent reversals. Indeed, natural resource driven 
boomlets in particular are notorious for the capacity destruction they 
can inflict on fragile public sectors – as the prospect of huge rents 
induces a country’s elites to undermine already fragile institutions of 
accountability.  
Yet for all the caveats, growth in each of the three examples 
signals that, at least in some circumstances – those where the 
underlying growth drivers are strong and/or capacity and institutional 
constraints are not overwhelmingly constraining -- ‘just enough 
governance’ would appear to be a viable short-term development - 29 - 
strategy.  A complex economy requires complex institutions – so at some 
point, the longer term constraints will need to be addressed.  Even so, 
as Figure 3 suggests, the longer  a ‘just enough governance’ strategy 
can be sustained, the broader is likely to be the constituency with a 
stake in stronger institutions, and hence the better may be the 
prospects for more far-reaching institutional reform.   
 
Sequence IV: Bottom-up Development; Civil Society as Entry Point 
There are many cases in which virtually all channels except for civil 
society are blocked:  there is little or no economic growth; state 
capacity is weak and government corrupt; democracy and rule of law are 
either non-existent or not readily fixable because political power is 
in the hands of actors with no desire to change the status quo.  In 
this case, the primary driver of development will be the mobilization 
of civil society, which will increase demands for greater democracy and 
rule of law, as well as a state that can deliver basic public services.  
The effect of this sequence on economic growth is often indirect.  
Civil society often demands political representation rather than growth 
in the first instance, while authoritarian or nominally democratic 
rulers oftentimes hope they can buy off potential opponents through 
their ability to deliver growth.   
It might be tempting to think about bottom-up development as a kind 
of residual strategy to be pursued only when all other channels are 
blocked.  (This is the way that it appears in the decision tree at the 
end of the article.)  In fact, promoting the development of civil 
society is an end in itself, and can be a critical complementary 
component to several of the other strategies.  This is clearest in the 
case of the transformational governance sequence.  While some forms of 
democracy promotion involve restructuring democratic and rule of law - 30 - 
institutions through constitutional change, or strengthening formal 
institutions like court systems or political parties, most 
practitioners in the democracy promotion field devote considerable 
energy to the development of a vigorous civil society – labor unions, 
watchdog groups, business roundtables, media organizations, and the 
like – because they are assumed to be part of a broader liberal 
democratic political order.   
Experiences and Challenges.  There are a number of cases where 
bottom-up development of civil society was the primary route to 
development.  For example, Poland during the 1980s was a communist 
country that had a nascent civil society, in the form of an independent 
trade union (Solidarity), private agriculture, and the Catholic Church.  
Neither rapid economic growth nor top-down political change appeared 
possible, but in 1989, the thawing of Cold War relationships suddenly 
made possible a dramatic breakthrough to liberal democracy and a market 
economy.  Poland had a considerable advantage over other post-communist 
states in making this transition because it had social actors outside 
the party nomenklatura that could fill the ensuing political vacuum. 
Ukraine was arguably another country in a situation where all 
channels but the civil society route were blocked in the first years of 
the 21
st century.  Ukraine had nominally democratic political 
institutions, but rule of law was very weak, and the political process 
heavily manipulated behind the scenes by various oligarchs and shadowy 
economic actors.  All branches of the state lacked capacity and 
corruption was rampant.  Ukraine’s formal institutions had received 
considerable external support from outside donors during the 1990s, 
very little of which had any evident impact on their performance.  
While economic growth had resumed by 2002, it was due less to good - 31 - 
economic policy than to favorable external conditions which affected 
virtually all countries in the global economy in that period.   
Under these circumstances, political change occurred not through 
reform of existing institutions, but by mobilization of civil society 
that put pressure on the government to open up the political process 
and make itself more genuinely accountable.  The Orange Revolution of 
December 2004 occurred when the incumbent president sought to 
manipulate the vote for a new president, a fraud that was documented by 
election observers and then publicized by Ukraine’s nascent independent 
media.  Civil society groups were sufficiently mobilized to protest 
these results and put enough pressure on the government to force a 
second election, which brought the Orange coalition to power.   
 
Figure 4: Bottom-Up Reform 
 
 
  Though the dotted lines in Figure 4 suggest how civil society 
development leading to bottom-up democratization might support growth, 
in practice the economic consequences are not clear, at least in the 
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short run, any more than they are for transformational governance.  
Ukraine has done well economically for most of the period since the 
Orange Revolution, but that improvement in performance was driven by 
external factors and likely would have occurred even in the absence of 
democratic change.  Nor is it clear that state capacity has increased, 
as levels of corruption remain high.  On the other hand, Ukraine today 
has a freer and more open media than neighboring Russia, something one 
presumes would benefit government accountability in the long run.  
 
How the Sequences Inter-relate 
   The four sequences described above are conceptual constructs – 
‘ideal types’ used to bring analytical order to messy, multi-faceted 
reality. The aim is to highlight some key features of country-level 
processes, not to suggest that these features capture the whole of a 
country’s development evolution.  On the contrary, there are likely be 
variations over time as to which of the four sequences best 
characterizes a country’s development dynamics.  And, at any point in 
time the reality may be a hybrid of more than one sequence. 
Consider how conditions change over time.  As already noted,  the 
‘state capacity building’ sequence seems highly likely to evolve over 
time into something different, insofar as its success creates new 
economic actors that seek more complex and open economic and political 
institutions than a state-centric model of development can provide.  
Similarly, a ‘just enough governance’ trajectory is likely to be 
temporary, either because, as with state capacity building, its success 
generates demand for more robust institutions, or because it comes up 
against an institutional constraint that cannot be eased incrementally.  
Only the ‘transformational governance’ sequence offers (in theory) the 
prospect of long-term institutional stability – although this - 33 - 
presupposes unusually far-reaching and effective institutional reforms 
up-front. 
Now consider the extent to which the four sequences indeed are 
distinct from one another.  The differences between state capacity 
building and just enough governance are stark:  the former is top-down, 
tightly-controlled and – insofar as it is implemented effectively – 
highly orderly; the latter is haphazard, seemingly chaotic.  The 
strengths of one are the weaknesses of the other.  Only in settings in 
which a broad range of institutions are already mature might they be 
perceived to converge – though, at that point, neither ‘state capacity 
building, nor ‘just enough governance’ accurately describe the 
realities on the ground.  
Overlap between the ‘transformational governance’ and ‘bottom-up 
reform’ sequences on the one hand,  and the other two sequences on the 
other is best understood through the lens of Carothers’ two partial 
variants of institutional transformation introduced earlier.  Insofar 
as transformation of political institutions and of civil society 
results in the de facto dominance of political actors who perceive 
themselves to enjoy stable incumbency and take a long-term view – i.e. 
Carothers’ dominant power politics variant --  the result could 
approximate quite closely the ‘state capacity building’ sequence.  But 
insofar as the  democratic and civil society transformations are more 
turbulent – i.e.  look more like feckless pluralism --  they might  
nonetheless unlock a dysfunctional equilibrium. This could  help 
unleash quite rapid economic growth, with the resulting chaotic 
dynamism resembling quite closely the ‘just enough governance’ 
sequence. 
  This last set of overlaps suggests the following speculation as 
to the relevance of ‘transformational governance’ in at least some low-- 34 - 
income developing countries.  As Carothers highlights, often the 
outcome of efforts to foster ‘transformational governance’ falls short 
of initial ambitious intentions. But might it be too negative to 
describe the results as ‘dysfunctional’?  Perhaps in many low-income 
countries transformational governance might better be viewed as 
catalytic – as a (risky) path to the ‘state capacity building’ or ‘just 
enough governance’ dynamic sequences.  Perhaps, in such countries, 
economic growth, combined with a seeming excess of order or a seeming 
excess of chaos may be in the (medium-term) nature of things, rather 
than an aberration that requires ‘fixing’.  
 
IV: THE ‘SEQUENCES FRAMEWORK’ AND DEVELOPMENT DECISION-MAKING 
This final section explores how the sequences framework, laid out 
in Section III can aid development decision-making. A key underlying 
issue is the balance between choice and constraint: how much scope do 
policymakers have to choose which route a country pursues – and how 
much is historically conditioned, is path dependent? To motivate this 
question consider the illustrative examples of Ethiopia, Korea and 
China.5
Over the past four decades, Ethiopia has lurched from semi-feudal 
monarchy, to hard-line communist, to market-oriented modernizer. Yet 
throughout, the seemingly transformed polity has been highly 
centralized, building on the inherited foundations of centuries of top-
    
                         
5 The use of these three examples should not be taken to suggest that 
low-income countries  generally thrive by beginning first with the state 
capacity building sequence. That hypothesis does not account for Bangladesh’s 
success with ‘just enough governance’, or for the kickstart that 
transformational governance provided to Kenya. Indeed, systematic data analysis 
points to a wide diversity of institutional starting points among low-income 
countries. See the appendix “Applying the Indicators – a Typology of Countries” 
in Levy (2007).   
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down monarchical control, and  correspondingly profoundly hierarchical 
social relations. Arguably, path dependence accounts for the repeated 
turn of Ethiopia’s political leaders to state capacity building as the 
country’s preferred development strategy. 
Through to the mid-1980s Korea also was an exemplar of a top-down 
developmental state, built (as in Ethiopia) on a centuries-long history 
of centralized control. (Henderson, 1968)  Yet over the past two 
decades, Korea increasingly has broken from its top-down, state-centric 
legacy and transited into an open, democratic society, governed by 
increasingly robust checks and balances institutions. Protagonists of 
deterministic path dependence might interpret Korea’s transformation 
less as a result of determined political leadership than as endogenous 
adaptation, a consequence of economic success. But there is no getting 
away from the role of leadership in accounting for China’s astonishing 
evolution over the past seventy years – from the collapse of warlordism 
in the face of a communist-led peasant revolution, to failed Maoist 
experimentation, to Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 exhortation that ‘to get rich 
is glorious’, which catalyzed a globally unprecedented growth surge – 
all, of course, within a broader frame of robust, deeply rooted central 
state capacity.  
 Certainly, as these three examples suggest, the sequences 
framework laid out in Section III should not be viewed as a 
technocratic toolkit from which a putative reformer is free to choose 
and implement his preferred option. On the contrary, to a significant – 
but not wholly determined – extent, choice is constrained, with 
country-specific history and politics shaping the trajectory of change. 
Recognizing that history constrains options, what is the scope for 
maneuver, for initiating or sustaining cumulative processes that can 
move development forward? The final subsection of this paper explores - 36 - 
how the broad perspective provided by the sequences framework can help 
address this question in a way that supports more skillful development 
decision-making. 
 
Making Choices: Governance Reforms as Development Strategy 
Figure 4 suggests a decision tree to help clarify how priorities 
for development reform might vary depending on specific country 
circumstances. The first fork in the decision tree distinguishes among 
countries according to their current development performance. Is a 
country’s current, short-term development trajectory a postive one – in 
which case the challenge is to sustain an ongoing process? Or is the 
challenge to kickstart development from a more ‘stuck’ place? 
For countries already on a dynamic path, the key point of 
departure should be to sustain existing momentum, on the principle that 
“if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”.  Following this admonition is not as 
easy as it sounds. For reasons that should now be clear, the governance 
realities even in the most dynamic of low-income countries often will 
be profoundly unsettling: perhaps an  underside of weak accountability 
alongside a dominant bureaucracy; perhaps a panoply of dysfunctions, 
each threatening imminently to short-circuit dysfunction. Certainly, 
over the medium-term the weaknesses will need to be addressed – but an 
excessive, too-rapid response could itself risk short-circuiting the 
momentum already underway. Country-specific political economy analysis 
will be key to assessing where the balance of risk lies as between 
doing too much or too little to address continuing weaknesses. 
In deciding how to proceed, a first step might be to explore the 
extent to which endogenous processes already are inducing reforms of 
lagging institutions – whether, for example, countries moving along a 
state capacity building trajectory also are - 37 - 
Figure 5: Country Circumstances and Development Sequences – A Decision Tree 
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beginning to invest in strengthening checks and balances institutions. 
If this is not happening, development reformers might usefully initiate 
work on the lagging governance dimensions – proceeding incrementally so 
as not to kill the goose currently laying golden eggs. 
The second major branch of Figure 5 lays out options for low-
income countries stuck with stagnant economies. A key judgment 
underlies reform choices vis-à-vis this group of countries: Should the 
agenda for reform push institutional change to the maximum extent 
feasible – or seek, rather, the minimum changes necessary to kickstart 
dynamism in a specific country setting? Comparing the four development 
sequences, transformational governance generally calls for the most 
far-reaching up-front changes, and just-enough governance the least 
far-reaching, with state capacity building and civil society 
development (depending how it is approached) somewhere in between. The 
decision tree in Figure 5 is constructed on the assumption that the 
preferred option generally is the least-disruptive one that is capable 
of unlocking dynamism, given a country’s specific circumstances. This 
assumption aligns well with the sequences framework, which underscores 
that causation is cumulative, and that a well-chosen first step can 
bring a cascade of dynamism in its wake. (The assumption is 
contestable, of course; others might prefer rather to ‘maximize’ 
reforms while a ‘window of opportunity’ is open. The judgments always 
are country-specific; there can be no fixed formula.)  
Thus, for low-income countries mired in stagnation, a key initial 
question is whether or not incremental reforms can unlock dynamism.6
                         
6 The ‘binding constraints’ approach to reform, proposed by 
Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2006) offers a promising analytical 
starting point for addressing this question. 
 As 
the decision tree suggests, ‘just enough governance’ is the obvious way - 39 - 
forward in countries whose political economy offers only scope for 
reform on the margin – and where incrementalism can work. If both 
incremental and non-incremental options are politically feasible, the 
choice is more contestable. 
  For stagnant countries where incremental reforms are unlikely to 
unlock dynamism, the relevant questions concern the incentives and 
constraints of political leaders. The decision tree suggests two 
options for reformist leaders. Where they enjoy the legitimacy and 
authority – as well as desire – to undertake far-reaching pro-
development reforms, the least institutionally disruptive option would 
be to focus on state capacity building and, perhaps, also associated 
efforts to foster  far-reaching economic reform. But as the ‘no’ branch 
of this last fork in the decision-tree suggests, even willing leaders 
may not enjoy the requisite authority and legitimacy. In such settings,  
‘transformational governance’, including actively fostering the 
development of civil society, comes onto the agenda as an entry point 
capable of kickstarting development dynamism.  
  In practice, of course, political leaders seeking to kickstart 
development via an institutional reform sequence (of either the state 
capacity building or transformational variety)  confront a more complex 
calculus – and more of a continuum of options --  than the heuristic 
framework of Figure 5 suggests.  How boldly transformational should 
their institutional reform efforts be?  And for how long? Even if 
leaders enjoy the legitimacy needed for state capacity building and 
associated bold economic reform, might there nonetheless be a case for 
a bolder, more transformative approach to governance to ‘lock-in’ 
change while a window of opportunity is open?  Conversely, even if 
legitimacy seems to be lacking, leaders might choose to push ahead - 40 - 
along the state capacity building/economic reform branch in the hope 
that success will yield political dividends down the road.  
Careful political economy assessments of the interests and likely 
responses of influential social actors can help support decision-
making.  Also key will be a readiness to adapt flexibly as the reform 
strategy unfolds.  Indeed, as suggested earlier, even where a country 
starts out with a bold strategy of institutional change, it may turn 
out to be sustained only to the point that the economy accelerates – a 
de facto reversion to ‘just enough governance’, and hence a less far-
reaching departure from the country’s historical (path dependent) 
trajectory than might initially have been intended. 
  The final fork in the decision tree comprises countries  that are 
stuck deep in a pit of dysfunction – with a stagnant economy, and 
decaying (or  even, at the limit, collapsing) institutions, fragmented 
authority, and non-developmental leadership. In such settings, the 
decision-tree suggests that civil society development emerges as the 
preferred entry point. For external actors, with less directly at 
stake, the relevant approaches generally should be appropriately modest 
and developmentally-oriented.  Interventions (typically donor-
supported)to foster civil society by channeling resources directly to 
communities, and engaging service users and communities in overseeing 
how the resources are used, can be quite effective in helping to 
alleviate poverty. They might also plant valuable seeds of social 
learning as to different ways of handling relationships between a 
country’s elites and its broader populace. But history suggests that 
such modest approaches are unlikely to unlock developmental dynamism in 
profoundly dysfunctional settings. In these latter settings,  far-
reaching domestically-driven social and political mobilization has 
proven decisive. Examples include: Ataturk’s modernization of Turkey; - 41 - 
China’s communist-led peasant revolution; Korea’s military government; 
colonial independence movements; the fall of President Marcos; the 
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union; 
South Africa’s transformation from apartheid to democracy;  the 
‘yellow’ ‘orange’ and ‘rose’ revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and the 
Kyrgyz Republic etc etc. Some of these aimed to foster development via 
a state capacity building sequence; others via transformational 
governance. Consideration of the drivers of far-reaching social and 
political mobilization – and its divergent trajectories, prospects and 
risks -- , falls outside the scope of the present paper. 
 
Concluding Comments 
The past fifteen years have seen an explosion of interest among 
both scholars and practitioners in governance, and its link to long-run 
development performance. Our goal in this paper has been to contribute 
to this discourse by laying out a framework that highlights the 
interactions between governance and growth, offers a broad view of the 
diverse strategic choices available to development decision-makers, and 
helps clarify how the preferred choice might be conditioned by a 
country’s unique historical circumstances. We identify four distinctive 
dynamic sequences, which differ from one another both in their points 
of entry and, more broadly, in ‘what comes before what’ as development 
unfolds. We explore how this ‘sequences framework’ can help guide 
choice, given the assumption that the preferred option generally is the 
least disruptive one that is capable of unlocking dynamism, given a 
country’s specific circumstances. Other assumptions also are plausible. 
And even with our assumption, there is much room for disagreement as to 
a country’s preferred development strategy – in part because the - 42 - 
dynamic sequences are heuristic constructs, with the reality likely to 
be a hybrid of more than one sequence.  
Our hope is that by making explicit multiple dynamic sequences -- 
and how decision-makers choices among them might vary according to a 
combination of country-specific empirical realities and preferences as 
between incremental and non-incremental change – we have helped lay the 
groundwork for a new generation of empirical work on the relationship 
between governance and development. We are aware that some readers will 
find this paper excessively sweeping, insufficiently anchored 
empirically, simplistic. But we worry less about these risks than the 
alternative that seems all too common in the current discourse: partial 
approaches; ‘cookie-cutter’ recommendations that fail to account for 
countries’ radically disparate circumstances; inattention to dynamic 
processes, to cumulative causation. 
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